As we approach the centenary of the female jury franchise in England and Wales, it is surprising how little has been written on its early history. Previous academic work has explored the role of feminist movements in campaigning against those rules -primarily the property qualifications and peremptory challenges -which kept women off the jury.
were otherwise qualified as jurors, it is important to note that the vast majority of people -men and women -were not qualified to begin with, as at this time jury qualification was still tied to the possession of land. The Juries Act 1825 had set the relevant qualifications as: freehold, copyhold or customary tenure worth at least ten pounds; leasehold (on at least a twenty-one-year lease) worth at least twenty pounds; assessment to the poor rate or inhabited house duty of at least twenty pounds (or thirty pounds in Middlesex); or the occupation of a house containing at least fifteen windows.
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These qualification rules were not abolished until the 1970s 14 and, as we shall see below, they resulted in very few people in 1920s England & Wales being qualified to serve.
The 1825 legislation establishing the property qualifications for jury service had provided that towns 'possess[ing] any jurisdiction, civil or criminal ... shall prepare their Panels in the manner heretofore accustomed'. 15 A 1913 inquiry had found there were still ten 'assize boroughs' which, having their own sessions independent of the county assizes, were exempt under the 1825 Act from observing the property qualifications. 16 This discretion was abolished almost exactly a year after the 1919 Act was passed, however, 17 and so by 1921 all trial jurors had to satisfy the property qualifications. As Lord Devlin put it in 1956:
The jury ... is predominantly male, middle-aged, middle-minded and middle-class ... It is the property qualification that makes it chiefly male simply because there are far fewer women householders than there are men. Clearly a system involving property qualifications, a judicial power to order single-sex juries, and peremptory challenges had at least the potential to exclude many women from jury service. Whether it actually did so was, as we shall see, something that differed from region to region.
England and Wales was not the only jurisdiction which had opened jury service to women during the first half of the twentieth century, but neither was it the only place where the reforms had been somewhat limited in practice. Despite the significant differences between English and Scottish juries (their larger size, for example, and the different types of verdict which can be returned), 19 the two systems shared perhaps two of the most significant means of keeping women off the jury:
peremptory challenges and the judicial discretion under the 1919 Act to order a single-sex jury. While research detailing the appearance of women on Scottish juries during the period under discussion
here has yet to be conducted, it is likely that female jury service in Scotland was broadly similar in practice to the system as it worked itself out in England. In Northern Ireland, the institution of female jurors was certainly controversial. In 1923, the Crown clerk of County Down asked an official inquiry into jury service to consider adding women to the list of people legally entitled to seek exemption;
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and as late as 1929 Wilson J complained that it was 'ridiculous' to keep on summoning women for jury service when they were systematically challenged off the jury either by the prosecution or by the defence. 'He could not excuse their attendance, but unless counsel sternly objected he thought he would tell them he would not fine them if they did not come.' 21 In the Republic of Ireland, women had gained the right to serve as jurors in 1927, albeit with the proviso that they had both to satisfy variable local property qualifications and to make a specific request to be included in the juror lists. two women serving during the previous decade, were an unconstitutional restriction on equality and on the representativeness implicit in the concept of jury trial.
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Unlike some jurisdictions, which had granted the jury franchise only to those women who had specifically asked to be registered, jury service for the qualified women of England and Wales was technically compulsory. In practice, however, English judges frequently asked women if they wanted to serve on particular trials. While this article focuses primarily on England and Wales, similar practices were also known elsewhere. As early as February 1921, the Northern Whig reported suggestions in the Belfast Recorder's Court that a greater proportion of men should be summoned. A judge of the Recorder's Court had noted that 'in the case of female jurors who had imperative household duties he would be disposed to exercise his privilege in favour of exemption if appealed to'. 24 Two years later, defence counsel in a Belfast murder trial successfully requested a judicial order for an all-male jury.
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One of the main focuses of this article will be the extent to which these kinds of judicial and administrative practices might have led to a selective, variable implementation of the 1919 Act's lifting of the prior ban on female trial jurors in England and Wales.
By using court records held at the National Archives, it has been possible to take a systematic approach to the 'mixed' juries of the 1920s, exploring the relationship between public debates about female jurors and the actual practices of the courts. This paper focuses on five regions of England and of those qualified to serve (denoted in the registers by a 'J' or an 'SJ') to those recorded in the assize books as serving jurors. This survey of three English towns finds no relation between the gender compositions of the juror pools and of actual juries, suggesting demographics are unlikely to account for the regional variations in female jury service at the assizes. Sections three and four explore potential reasons for the regional variations, drawing primarily on the assize records themselves (which occasionally record why it was that a pre-existing jury lost all its female members before moving on to a new trial) and on contemporaneous newspaper reports (which occasionally explore the underlying assumptions of court officials, lawyers and female jurors themselves). These sections find that as well as peremptory challenges as judicial orders for single-sex juries, women were often encouraged -in a far less formal way -to excuse themselves; and that the types of trial from which women were excluded from varied from region to region. In other words, the strategies for keeping women off the jury after 1919 were not solely legalistic, and were informed by variable local attitudes to women's acceptable public roles.
The public debate over female jury service
During the 1920s, public responses to the introduction of female trial jurors formed part of the general debate about newly-enfranchised women. As Logan in particular has noted, organised women's groups had led the way for many important changes within the criminal justice system more generally.
The fact that today's magistrates receive regular professional training, for example, can be directly traced back to the decision among many of the first female JPs that they should organise some formal training for themselves.
30 But just as female politicians had found themselves frequently confined to -as well as campaigning on the basis of -apparently 'feminine' issues (education, public health, presumed expertise in traditionally feminine subjects. These strategies had to be developed in order to 'combat a range of negative images of women philanthropists and social workers that suggests that even seemingly uncontroversial, gendered claims to special talents and abilities could face outright male hostility'. 34 As we shall see below, similar arguments were frequently made about women on juries: that their presumed expertise in particular matters, or experience with particular types of people, made them essential in particular kinds of trial.
That such arguments might be considered necessary can be seen in the way Home Office officials had responded to Lord Reading's proposed judicial power to order single-sex juries:
So long as the Bar is composed wholly of men the ensuing debate [in an individual trial] is likely to be carried on without any unseemly intrusion of sex-'prejudice', but 'feminists' will make sure that in a few years there is a sufficient supply of female barristers to argue the question with the acrimony and heat which 'feminists' are apt to import into all their controversies. Again when a woman is to be tried for the murder of her illegitimate baby there will be a female barrister first to claim that she should be tried by women only and then to challenge any juror who does not belong to a 'feminist' society.
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Female jurors, on this account, were part of a more general feminist invasion of exclusively male public spaces, and the Chief Justice's amendment -permitting judges to order single-sex juries either on 46 This argument could cut both ways, however, and was often used as a way of rebuking women for presuming to the rights of citizenship without being willing to take on its burdens. We have already seen an early example of this argument in the Derby Evening Telegraph article above. But women's groups were also able to use ideas of citizenship to argue against the apparently common practice amongst lawyers of using their legal powers (in particular peremptory challenges and the judicial power to order a single-sex jury) to keep women off the jury, 47 noting that this practice undermined each of the arguments in favour of female jury service.
This debate was pursued not only in the press and public meetings, but also in short stories, plays and films. 'Double Demon', for example, imagined a jury including a husband and wife. were particularly important where a woman was being tried.
The gender composition of the assize juries
How many women were actually summoned for jury service? As Table 1 shows, drawing on the civil judicial statistics for England and Wales, in those jurisdictions which used sheriffs to summon their jurors there were on average 3.2 women for every twelve jurors summoned in 1922, a rate which fell steadily until by 1929 it was as low as 2.7 in every twelve. In those towns whose jurors were summoned by the borough clerk of the peace, rather than by a sheriff, the representation of women on jury panels was noticeably higher. In 1922, there were on average 4.4 women among every twelve borough jurors; a rate which had, again, fallen to 3.0 by 1929. The higher rate of women among the borough jury pools could be explained by the fact local officials were required to summon at least fourteen female jurors for each panel; 63 a requirement which may have lifted the average significantly in less busy courts (which the borough assize courts certainly tended to be), as they often needed to summon only a small number of jurors. The Crown Minute Books for the assize circuits studied in this paper paint a similar picture, of local variation and of decline, regarding the female jurors who made it out of the panel and onto an actual jury. As Table 2 shows, there was a striking difference between the trial juries' gender composition at the various circuits. In the Midland and Oxford circuits (comprising the Midlands), the representation of women on assize juries was much higher than in South Wales and in the South Eastern and Western circuits (comprising the south of England minus London). In all five of these regions, the average gender composition of the assize juries steadily became more male as the decade continued; although by 1929 the average number of women on juries in the Midlands was still roughly double that seen elsewhere. As with the women summoned, the number of women serving steadily declined as the decade continued; and some regions, despite this overall decline, had many more women on their juries than others. As historians tracing the histories of the first female barristers have found, women's formal acceptance depended to a great extent on how they were viewed by those already working within a particular circuit. juries, is further evidence of the ways different circuits responded to the admission of women into the law. one of the broader themes of this paper: that local administrative practices, and local habits more generally, continued to impact upon the composition of assize juries, even after government had attempted to guarantee a consistent national system by abolishing the assize boroughs' discretion regarding juror qualification and summoning practices.
Is it possible that there were simply more women qualified for jury service in some areas than in others? In order to answer this question, the electoral register for spring 1925 (the middle of the period under discussion here) has been consulted for three English towns, each from a different assize 69 In other words, local officials had a great deal of discretion regarding the discharge of their duties. women for every twelve. There was, it should be noted, little obvious relationship between the numbers qualified in a given town and the numbers actually serving. Leicester had the fewest women as a proportion of its total jury pool, but had the highest average number of women on its juries of the three, with an average throughout the decade of 3.1 women per jury. In Norwich, whose juror pool had a very similar gender composition to Leicester, there was an average of only 1.6 women per jury; while in Bristol, which had by far the highest proportion of women in its pool of possible jurors, the average jury contained only 1.3 women. 74 Demographics, then, were not a good predictor of female jury service.
Were the lawyers' powers to remove women frequently used?
71 The fact people could still be registered at multiple addresses at this time means there is some slight overlap in the figures below, where for example a person is registered both at their home and at their business. The numbers of such double-registered people appear to be reasonably small, however. Furthermore, the fact such double-counting happened both for jurors and for non-jurors means any attempt to exclude duplicates from the analysis would require the identification of each duplicate among the nearly 400,000 individuals -jurors and non-jurors -named in the electoral registers consulted. For this reason, a small amount of overlap has to simply be acknowledged as a limitation of the method used. Act. McCardie J denied that he had the power to make the order the juror sought, and added that he had no desire to set a precedent in favour of her argument. 80 Newspaper reports emphasised the distressing nature of the evidence subsequently heard at court (thereby making it a case which did, prima facie, satisfy s 1(b)), and the press subsequently asked one of the women -Matilda Tuck -about her experience. She explained that 'the greatest ordeal was the first entry into Court. Once the case began we became more confident'. 81 As we shall see below, the press was often interested in any struggles female jurors may have had when trying particularly shocking cases. What makes this case so unusual is the thwarted attempt by a female juror to be involved in the gender composition issue -at least in a direct, legalistic way. In practice, women were frequently permitted to excuse are not recorded, by identifying cases where women are removed from a pre-existing jury, but the jury is otherwise unchanged, and the offence type is not one from which women were habitually removed (on which more will be said below). In such circumstances, it is unlikely that the judge will have exercised his discretion to order a single-sex jury, meaning their exclusion likely came from a use of the peremptory challenge.
There were many examples of this at the provincial assizes. Despite a judicial willingness to allow jurors to excuse themselves from trials they were likely to find upsetting (such as the two army veterans who in 1920 were excused from serving on a murder trial owing to medically-certified 'nervous debility'), 90 many of these trials were not obviously any more upsetting than the preceding trials, making the jurors unlikely to be the source of the excusal, and making it unlikely that the judge had ordered a single-sex jury. At Norwich in January 1921, for example, a jury of two women and ten an offence unlikely to have produced a single-sex jury order, or a request by the women to be excused.
With this case, as with many of the others, it is only possible to say that the women had been removed: the precise reason for their removal, or indeed the precise mechanism by which they were removed, is a question of necessarily imprecise interpretation. Occasionally the records explicitly state that female jurors had been peremptorily challenged, as at Hampshire the following month. Here, three women had participated in a jury which had found a man guilty of stealing a horse; but when their second trial for larceny of a horse came up the assize records note that the women 'are challenged by the prisoner'. 92 It is, nonetheless, impossible to identify every trial where jurors were peremptorily challenged.
A further reason why uses of these legal powers were not regularly recorded may have been that judges found other, quieter ways of accommodating their views about the types of trial which were unsuitable for female jurors. At the winter 1921 Wiltshire assizes, Bailache J warned his alreadyempanelled female jurors that the next case was not a nice one at all and if the ladies wished it, he was prepared to excuse them from acting on the jury. They could remain if they liked. The ladies, on hearing this, appeared relieved, and left the court.
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On occasion, counsel asked the judge to make this kind of offer to the jury, as in a special jury trial at the High Court in December that year, where the future MP and later High Court judge JA Hawke KC said he thought the trial ('a highly complicated business action') 'would confuse the women, and he was quite willing that they should be released and men substituted'. Unusually, one of the female jurors interrupted at this point, explaining 'that she was intelligent enough to understand the action Quakerism. Roche J did not consider conscientious objection a good reason for a person to avoid jury duty, but was happy to excuse her nonetheless.
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These factors all introduced a large element of flexibility, raising the possibility of distinct regional practices developing: perhaps certain types of crime were considered unsuitable for women by the regional bar in some areas and not in others. It is also important to note the potential this flexibility had to dissuade local officials from summoning very many women in the first place: despite early fears that feminist barristers would seek to exclude all men from certain juries, 96 the pressure was entirely in the other direction, with predictable administrative consequences. As the Dundee Evening Telegraph explained, reflecting on Baron Trevethin's actions at the High Court discussed above:
If these precedents are extended, then, according to a Law Court view, the officers concerned in providing juries will have their work cut out to anticipate the Judge's mind.
They work with a margin, consequently, it is pointed out, the inconvenience will fall ultimately on male jurymen, who are thus kept "hanging about" in case they are wanted as substitutes for jurors allowed to depart if they wish to.
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Clearly this was not only a question of administrative and legal decision-making: the women in question were left with a choice in a way they were not where a judge simply ordered an all-male jury, as the fact two women chose to remain on Trevethin's jury shows; and various women's groups were keen to emphasise how irresponsible it was for women to voluntarily give up their newly-won citizenship rights by stepping down from a jury. happened: as the 1920s progressed, the number of women summoned declined, and so too did the numbers actually serving, even in regions such as the Midland circuit which had started the decade with so many women on their juries.
Were women routinely removed from certain types of trial?
There was a widespread perception that women should (and did) not serve on juries for particular kinds of trial, but this perception did not always match reality. In 1924, when Rowlatt J presided over a public lecture on criminal law, he explained that the practice of using peremptory challenges to secure all-male murder juries 'had become in his experience universal'. In the five circuits studied in this paper, however, he is recorded as presiding over eight murder trials between 1921 and 1924, and of these only two had had all-male juries. Nonetheless, he thought the reasons for his claimed lack of women on juries in murder trials was obvious: while women would be overly moved by the sight of a 'weeping widow', men 'would take into account the surrounding circumstances, and any fact that told in favour of the prisoner'. 99 For Rowlatt, the reason female jurors were apparently excluded from murder trials was simply that they lacked the capacity to see past their own emotions. If women were to intrude into the jury box at all, they ought to be restricted to less emotive trials. And as we shall see below, juries containing no women were particularly rare in trials for property offences.
Against this backdrop, of a public commitment to the idea women should not sit as jurors in certain 'shocking' types of trial, several women's groups made the argument -dramatized in Belloc
Lowndes' 'What Really Happened' -that women were better placed than men to judge the testimony of women and children. appropriate to have an all-male jury was where a jury was required to judge offences committed by men against other men, as female experience was considered less essential here to the production of a fair verdict. 101 This would appear to be a necessary corollary to the general argument, implicitly adopting the terms of the argument against female jurors, that they were particularly needed in cases involving women or children.
The fact judges frequently invited women to decide whether they wanted to serve in 'shocking' trials brought female jurors' own understanding of their role into the public debate. When 104 As Bland has explained, the Ilford case was used by the press to criticise modern women for their regular attendance in the public gallery: 'if they were so obsessed with seeking sensation, how could they judge impartially?'
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Studholme's comments were only hypothetical, however, and were not informed by any actual experience of serving on a homicide trial. Those who did serve on murder trials frequently found the experience difficult to forget. A woman who had served on a Leeds assize jury in a murder trial, in circumstances which would soon become the non-capital offence of infanticide, 106 suggested 'women liable to serve on juries should band themselves together, and refuse to be placed in the position of being obliged to cause such a monstrous sentence to be passed on a fellow woman'. 107 Another Leeds woman, who served on the trial of a man for murdering his wife, revealed to the local press her jury's agonised attempts to reach a fair verdict, and her own guilt about depriving the couple's children of a second parent. 108 The fact these sorts of detailed questions were only generally put to women who had sat on 'shocking' trials may have helped to reinforce the public perception that female jurors ought to be excluded from particular types of trial.
As we have seen, there was a perception that women should be routinely removed from particular types of trial, and also that they were regularly removed. We have also seen how this kind of public perception might have discouraged local officials from summoning as many women as they might otherwise have done. This does not mean court officials were entirely neutral, however. In 1921,
Stephen Coleridge, clerk of assize for the South Wales circuit and son of the former Lord Chief Justice, complained to The Times about whoever it was who was the extraordinary person responsible for forcing Clerks of Assize to call men and women indifferently and together to decide the question of guilt or innocence in cases of rape, or bestiality, or other unspeakable crimes ... It is a loathsome duty for 12 men or for 12 women to discuss with each other the disgusting details of this sort of case, but no one should have the "option" of forcing men and women to discuss them together.
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There is, indeed, evidence that all this resulted in women being routinely removed from particular Table 3 reports the percentage of trials in each of nine offence types with all-male juries. A series of chi-square tests found that, for each circuit, there was a highly significant difference among the percentage of all-male juries in the different categories of crime (p<0.001 for each circuit). The 'adjusted residual' column, calculated using SPSS, shows which offence types had greater or fewer allmale juries than would be expected given the number of trials and the regional average. Statisticians explain that, for a chi-square table with many categories, a particular category is significantly different from the overall distribution where the adjusted residual is more than about +/-3 113 or, where the data is being used 'as a guide to what might be of interest', where it is more than about +/-2.58. 114 For male-only sexual offences, the adjusted residual score goes well beyond +/-3 in all five circuits; and for property offences the test is passed in three out of five circuits. In other words, comparing all-male juries for each offence type to the regional average, they were far more likely in male-only sexual offences in all five circuits; while they were less likely in property offences in three out of five circuits.
This suggests a strong agreement, throughout much of the country, that male-only sexual offences were extremely unsuitable for female jurors, and that property offences were among the most suitable offences for women to try. regarding, e.g., non-fatal offences in one of the five circuits) suggests different local bars may have had different ideas about which sorts of trials women should and should not be permitted to serve on. It is also notable that these indicative differences are all in the south of England or south Wales, where female participation on assize juries was generally lower anyway. In the Midlands, where female participation on assize juries was higher, there are no sizable differences in the percentage of all-male juries beyond the two offence types -male-only sexual offences and property offenceswhere there was a national consensus that female jurors were either particularly welcome or particularly unwelcome. A stronger tradition of including women on assize juries correlates with a general indifference to the types of crime where female jurors should appear; while in those places where female jurors were less common in general, greater local differences emerged regarding the types of crime where women did or did not appear as jurors.
Given the Midland barristers' association took decades to admit women to the privileges of formal membership (regular dinners with the judges, for example, to say nothing of the discounted hotel rates which would have made their professional existence much easier), 115 it can hardly be said that the local legal culture of the Midland circuit was a feminist utopia. It can, however, be said with certainty that local officials here were paying attention, given the technically superfluous comments and cuttings on female jurors which appear reasonably regularly in the circuit's minute book during the 1920 and 1921 sessions. Equally, the dispute between the clerk of assize for the Western circuit and various town and county officials regarding their customary practices for the summoning of jurors suggests the assize officials here took a strict, officious approach to the running of the circuit's affairs.
It may have been that the local bar shared a broad approach to female jurors with their assize officials.
But it should also be noted that, when the Home Office asked Darling J to explain his objection to the customary method of summoning jurors at the Bristol assizes in early 1920, he explained that the circuit clerk had better explain as it had been the clerk's idea to confront the Bristolian authorities.
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While it is difficult to disaggregate the influence over female jury composition coming from the local bar and from the local administration, it is clear that different circuits had different views about the kinds of trial which it was appropriate for women to try as jurors.
Conclusions
In 1951, the Home Office was asked to look into juror summoning practices at the Leicester assizes. A local accountant had complained that he had served at the borough assizes four times in the past eight years, despite there being over 7,000 people qualified for jury service in the city and approximately 1,000 jurors being summoned to the assizes each year. 117 After several seemingly wilfully unhelpful responses to the Home Office's inquiries, the authorities at Leicester eventually revealed they had been ignoring the law on jury selection for at least thirty years. The relevant impropriety as far as the accountant was concerned was that, for every three hundred jurors summoned, approximately twenty reliable, experienced jurors would be deliberately summoned, and the accountant had had the misfortune to find himself on one of the lists of good jurors. While the Home Office eventually secured a promise that the practice at Leicester would change, officials privately recognised that there was very little they could actually do short of a parliamentary inquiry.
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It is possible that such practices continued even after the 1950s, with a randomised, computerised system for the selection of jurors only coming into existence in 1981. 119 In our period, the 'assize boroughs' had not lost their right to ignore the property qualifications until 1920. In any event, when tracing the gender composition of the juries at the five assize circuits studied here it becomes clear that women were much better represented on juries in some regions than in others. It is possible that Midlands women were far wealthier than the women of southern England, meaning many more of them were qualified to serve; but the survey of juror qualification at Bristol, Leicester and Norwich does not suggest this is likely. This possibility would also fail to explain why as the decade continued there would be fewer female jurors in each circuit, at the same time that the rate of female jurors was increasing in the capital. Local administrative discretion must be part of the answer.
We have seen that there was much public debate about the use of female jurors during the 1920s, and we have also seen that much of this debate concerned the types of trial which were or were not suitable for women. Much of the pro-female juror argument sought to advance women's involvement in public life by, paradoxically, drawing on traditional understandings of feminine roles.
Because women were mothers, and because they often had experience of a peculiarly feminine, caring type of public service (as Belloc-Lowndes' Nora Norwich did), it was assumed that they could understand women of all social backgrounds in a way men could not hope to do. Women must, therefore, appear as jurors wherever they also appear as defendants, as victims, or as witnesses. But in maintaining that there were some types of trial where women were particularly needed, such arguments may have helped to legitimise their counterpart: that there were some types of trial which women could not endure. The success of all these arguments will have largely depended on their reception by the lawyers, and so another part of any explanation for the variable appearance of women on the provincial assize juries must be the attitudes of the different regional bars. This is something which it is difficult to find direct evidence of, but which can be inferred from the patterns of all-male juries discussed above.
Lawyers at the assizes frequently invited women to decline to serve, or when they were acting more formally they used the opportunities given them by s 1(b) of the 1919 Act or their peremptory challenges in order to achieve the same end. But despite the common argument that women were particularly (un)necessary in particular types of case, it is only in male-only sexual offences and in property offences where they were either more or less likely to be excluded from assize juries throughout the country. Regional factors meant all-male juries were less likely in trials for homicide or for offences against the state in Southeast England, less likely in trials for non-fatal offences against the person in South Wales, and less likely in trials for all sexual offences in the Southwest of England.
Government had attempted to guarantee consistency, by requiring that the gender balance of those called to serve matched that of the local population, subject always to a minimum of fourteen female jurors; and by abolishing the assize boroughs' discretion to follow local custom when summoning their jurors. Local factors were, nonetheless, a stubbornly consistent factor in the first decade of female jury service. By recognising this fact, we can see just how uneven the female jury franchise was in its early years, and just how much it had to be fought for by those who thought women should no longer be kept off the jury.
